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
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## What are they doing *right*? Tweeting right-wing intersectionality in Latin America

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### ABSTRACT

Despite the contributions of intersectional approaches, the academic and political left is challenged by competing interests in class, gender, race, and other axes of inequality and power. The disconnect between research on political economy, on the one hand, and on culture and subjectivity, on the other, is stark in Latin American studies. In contrast, an emerging feature of the global radical right is the gathering of these dimensions in simultaneous attacks to different strands of progressive politics and scholarship. The enemy is defined in economic *and* cultural terms: thus, feminism is frequently referred to as an extension of communism while Marxism is understood as part of cultural conspiracies to destroy healthy families and normal lifestyles. We call this phenomenon right-wing intersectionality (RWI). Through a mixed-methods approach, the article explores how RWI manifests in 20 leading influencers, activists, and politicians. The research included the systematic content analysis of 30,858 tweets.

### KEYWORDS

Right-wing politics; Latin America; Twitter; intersectionality; feminism

### Introduction: analysing the Latin American far-right beyond indignation

This article builds on our curiosity around the capacity of the Latin American far-right to persuade and inspire. In a political context where conservatives seem to be reclaiming the public debate with significant gains, we focus on one specific and important feature of their most extreme wing: the simultaneous attack on the left, feminism, and the social diversity agenda. We argue that such an attack both mirrors and reverses ‘intersectionality’ and thus call this political narrative right-wing intersectionality (RWI).<sup>1</sup>

Intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989; Viveros Vigoya, 2016) is a social science approach that entails the acknowledgment and exploration of the multidimensional character of power and the connections between race, class, gender and other axes of social positioning and inequality.<sup>2</sup> As such, it has complexified the critical analysis of society and politics. Studies on intersectionality have also had an intimate relationship with progressive activism, and they are not shy about their normative dimensions.<sup>3</sup>

What we call RWI *mirrors* intersectionality because it mobilizes and talks about ‘intersections’ between cultural, economic and social issues. However, it also *reverses* intersectionality normatively by embodying a conservative form of activism that defends racial, gendered and class hierarchies and attacks the different theories and movements that challenge them. In other words, the

intersectional political agenda of the Latin American far-right is radically opposed to the one associated with scholars and activists of intersectionality as we know it.

The narrative under analysis combines the current conservative angst around feminism (Dragiewicz, 2008; Faludi, 1991; Segato, 2018; Van Wormer, 2008) with cold-war style of anticommunist rhetoric (Ravecca, 2015; Scirica, 2014).<sup>4</sup> Its main targets are the left, feminism, the LGBTQ movement and the gains they have achieved in the last years, particularly in the context of the so-called pink tide (i.e. the series of progressive governments that led the region at the outset of the twenty-first century).<sup>5</sup> Through RWI's lenses all forms of progressive politics are considered as a transnationally organized *and unified* enemy that undermines the very fabric of 'Western Civilization'.

Our study on RWI expands and complexifies the analysis of the Latin American right and the elites (Chiasson-LeBel, 2019; North & Clark, 2018; Eaton, 2014; Luna & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014). This is because, first, we focus our attention on the ideational dimension of politics, particularly the ideological innovations within the regional far-right; and second, because this narrative is usually practiced by nonmainstream political actors such as evangelical pastors, Catholic opinion leaders as well as young social media influencers. These radical voices sometimes collaborate with the conservative establishment in its fight against the left, but sometimes challenge the former for being too moderate and soft. In any case it is important to keep in mind that RWI is about electoral politics as much as it is about culture.<sup>6</sup>

One of the most salient features of RWI is that it is expressed both in religious and secular languages. The use of scientific jargon against feminism makes the attack palatable for broader audiences. This is an important feature of how 'intersections' (in this case between religion and science) are mobilized by the far-right. Movements such as *Con mis hijos no te metas*<sup>7</sup> in Perú or *Escola sem Partido*<sup>8</sup> in Brazil are at the forefront of this battle and have successfully entered the institutional arena, affecting public policy and legislation. This public legitimization of RWI's extreme views has been facilitated by social media.<sup>9</sup> For example, WhatsApp and Twitter have been instrumental for its dissemination in Latin America. Indeed, some features of these platforms are particularly welcoming to the extreme perspectives of RWI.

This article begins by further conceptualizing RWI, then we situate it within right-wing politics in Latin America and expand on the centrality of the notion of gender ideology in its script. Finally, we present our findings. The study shows how the far-right uses RWI to influence public debates, leverage political power, and impact public opinion. We also explore how RWI is used to create new political identities that resonate with (widening) publics, and how this is done through Twitter.

The empirical analysis employs a mixed-methods approach. The study's sample includes 30,858 tweets by 20 leading activists and politicians from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Perú, and Uruguay. We show the intersectional character of RWI by identifying the presence of, and correlation between, theoretically significant terms as well as the emotions attached to them. The exploration was conducted for each one of the individuals, but we also offer an aggregated analysis of the whole sample.

The evidence validates our argument and clearly illustrates how far-right actors tackle economic, cultural, *and* social issues while attacking the left and feminism simultaneously (i.e. RWI). To further specify the findings and deepen the analysis in qualitative terms, we focus on the discourse of three activists. Furthermore, throughout we interpretatively (Carver, 2020; Geertz, 1997; Ravecca, 2019) engage with tweets that exemplify RWI. We conclude that RWI is both theoretically and politically significant and suggest that, in order to make sense of the emerging far-right movement in Latin America, we need to put indignation aside for a moment, and engage its ideological innovations.

## An effective conservative narrative maneuver: right-wing intersectionality (RWI)

Scholarship on intersectionality has become extensive, nuanced, and in fact it has produced an entire subfield within the social sciences (Crenshaw, 1989; Mügge et al., 2018; Nash, 2017; Phoenix & Pattynama, 2006). The term refers to ‘the relationships among multiple dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject formations’ (McCall, 2005, p. 1771). Thus, the intersectional perspective involves the acknowledgment and exploration of the multidimensionality of power and of the interconnections between race, class, gender, and other axes of social positioning and inequality. The approach opened up key notions of the social sciences such as power and oppression, expanding the very conception of politics beyond any narrow or one-dimensional container (be it the economy or formal institutions). For this reason, it has been perceived as an important intervention in the politics of knowledge production.

Debates about intersectionality revolve around the separability or inseparability between the social dimensions that are analytically ‘intersected’ (Gunnarsson, 2017); the appropriate methodological strategies for analysis (McCall, 2005); the multiple geographies of the approach’s genealogy (Viveros Vigoya, 2016) and the role in it of black feminisms, women of colour feminisms and Latin American feminisms (Gonzalez, 1988; Lugones, 2008; Viveros Vigoya, 2015; 2016); the relationship between scholarship and social movements (Viveros Vigoya, 2016); as well as the potential neoliberal co-option and use of intersectionality as a tool for diversity management (Puar, 2007). Our intention is *not* to participate in the debates *about* the approach. Instead, this article aims to deploy the category of intersectionality in a novel way. Concretely, we want to highlight a conservative narrative that actively intersects different axes of social positioning in – for many people – inspiring ways. We recognize that naming part of the right as intersectional might be shocking and yet we consider that our project honours the spirit of the approach, that is, the critical dismantling of power relations and dynamics of oppression.

Intersections can be mobilized in different ways.<sup>10</sup> The intersectional nature of RWI lies in that the opponents and the issues at stake take an *inter*-sectional form. In its narrative there is a straightforward connection between economic and non-distributive issues. Thus, the defence of private property, the resistance against redistributive policies, the promotion of the traditional family, and the assertion of the ‘natural’ difference between men and women, to name a few typical themes, become part of a unified political agenda. RWI conceives social hierarchies as the moral anchor of society and defends them by attacking the theories and movements that challenge them.

RWI practices an us-versus-them kind of politics. The ‘us’ gathers liberal and Christian attributes and sensibilities. The enemy is a mixture of Marxism, feminism, and other ‘radical’ views. Under the eye of RWI, socialists, antiracists, and feminists fabricate objects to critique (patriarchy), exaggerate problems (racism) and assault natural/fair structures (*the* family, capitalism). In the process they collectively undermine the fundamentals of a well-ordered society (biological differences, the market economy, law and order, etc.). While the ‘us’ is depicted as a freedom fighter, the ‘them’ is constructed as totalitarian. In this simple narrative there is so much at stake in the fight that defeat is not an option, and the right-wing outrage becomes more and more intense.<sup>11</sup>

The intersectional narrative of RWI also moves along the spectrum between separability and inseparability: Marxism and feminism are sometimes described by right-wing activists as natural allies, implying that they are thought of as two separate entities. But other times RWI assumes a more mobile form of intersectionality in which socialism and feminism become the same and fluid political chameleonic ‘thing’. In this context, temporality matters and becomes political: Feminism is at times denounced as the new Marxism or as the way socialism has been resuscitated,

following the collapse of the Soviet Union.<sup>12</sup> Some right-wing intellectuals have put these insights very explicitly in writing (without calling them RWI obviously); salient examples are Aguayo and Rosas (2019) as well as Márquez and Laje (2017). We find it interesting that whereas progressives are still dealing with the tensions between the traditional left and emerging political agendas (Ravecca & Upadhyay, 2013), some right-wing movements, leaders and thinkers seem to have overcome such a divide.

### RWI in the context of the Latin American right

The progressive governments of the 2000s not only failed to meet the expectations of their supporters but also generated widespread frustration – though for different reasons, obviously – on both sides of the ideological spectrum (Abbot & Levitsky, 2020; Dabène, 2020). The right has been able to protect its interests in the region (North & Clark, 2018). Furthermore, during the pink tide the right went through learning processes (Chiasson-LeBel, 2019). Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser (2014) offer a general examination of the Latin American right and focus on three forms of political engagement: interest representation through nonelectoral channels, electoral politics through non-partisan electoral vehicles, and party building.

In the same volume Eaton (2014) focuses on the first type, analysing strategies that target state institutions, strategies that focus on civil society, and strategies that emphasize identity formation. According to the author, in recent years the right has incorporated forms of political action typical of the left, for example, backing social movements, partaking in protests, and facilitating other forms of direct action. In his view, it is the likelihood of losing the battle along class lines that sustains the right's efforts 'to shift the terms of struggle toward territorial and sectoral identities, political frames that give it a much better chance of success against the left' (Eaton, 2014, p. 77). In this analysis, class seems to be the 'real' or main terrain for conflict.

We want to offer an alternative view. We agree that 'the right has innovated in its search for effective strategies in an era of left dominance' (p. 77) and, in fact, this is the context within which we situate the emergence of RWI. However, in our perspective ideology, public narratives, as well as the different axes of power (race, gender, morality, and so on) need to be taken seriously if our aim is to understand right-wing politics in their fullness. For these purposes, we situate RWI in the landscape of the right's effort to affect the terrain of culture and produce hegemony (Gramsci, 2008; Laclau & Mouffe, 2004). RWI is a salient way in which the right crafts political identities. Furthermore, this is not at all disconnected from electoral strategies and public policy outcomes.

We also disagree with Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser (2014, p. 369) in that the 'old battle line of secular versus religious' is 'less relevant' today. Such a battle has experienced changes but is at the centre of the current Latin American political *milieu*. In fact, one of the pathways towards empowerment for the right has been a Christian conservative reaction (Kourliandsky, 2019; Vaggione & Campos Machado, 2020) which, in Brazil for instance, combines the attacks against the Workers Party with anti-feminist backlash.<sup>13</sup> Religion is in fact a key component of RWI. However, religious fundamentalism has two other rather unexpected companions: science and liberalism. RWI's rhetoric combines the engulfing power of religious illumination with the concreteness of positivist science. Appeals to liberalism are weaponized and jammed into the defence of conservative values. In this way, RWI cunningly gathers a coalition of diverse voices and is strategically silent about the frictions between them.

RWI organizes the political terrain through simple associations that remove any sense of complexity from the picture. The political landscape gets divided between 'us' (i.e. healthy families,

decent and hard-working people, straight and religious individuals, gender-conforming men and women who respect nature) and ‘them’ (i.e. radical feminists, subversive leftists, atheists, and LGBTQ people). The latter are narrated as esoteric, complicated, crazy, immoral, and dangerous. RWI’s articulations of the natural, normal, and desirable serve to pathologize and vilify. The stark division between friends and foes is done in emotionally charged ways and sometimes invokes conspiracy theories.

RWI defends inequality and oppression by claiming that they do not exist and that the social justice activists are the ones breaking the harmony of a functioning system. To do this political work, RWI mobilizes the prejudices provided by the hierarchies it protects, thus feminists are portrayed as hysterical and foolish, union members are described as lazy and parasitic, while gays and lesbians are depicted as a dangerous influence for kids, and so on. These groups are not perceived as just ‘broken’ people, but also as highly toxic, as they undermine the very fundamentals of manhood, womanhood, and decency. They are corrupt and, what is much worse, they have the ability to corrupt policies, bodies, and souls.

RWI incarnates a patriarchal, macho way of engaging in political and intellectual debate. As we will show in detail later, its activists punch-with-words and galvanize troubling aspects of the human condition such as the inclination to humiliate and degrade as well as the pleasure of dominating and being above the other. There are, for example, countless online posts, published mostly by young activists, that describe a conservative influencer ‘owning’, ‘destroying’, ‘humiliating’, and ‘defeating’ a leftist or a feminist. The terms are brutal, war-like, and often sexualized.

At the same time, RWI’s activists dispute notions of guilt, victimhood, and innocence. They claim that their opponents weaponize their self-identification as victims to harm society. In an effective narrative maneuver, feminists and leftists turn into perpetrators deserving punishment: the dissolute woman who kills the baby in her womb without remorse, the minorities that take advantage of the state, the gays who are actually child molesters, the lazy rabble that enjoy a good life on the backs of hard-working citizens.

### **RWI, gender ideology, and freedom**

The best-seller *El libro negro de la nueva izquierda. Ideología de género o subversión cultural* (*The Black Book of the New Left. Gender Ideology or Cultural Subversion*) by Agustín Laje and Nicolás Márquez has become a sort of far-right manifesto in Latin America and Spain. Its authors are praised and followed by other activists who, in countless seminars and interviews, introduce them as ‘the terror’ of feminists and leftists.

The book’s scholarship is rather poor, and yet, it is a remarkable political artefact (Goldentul & Saferstein, 2020), so its prominence within right-wing politics in the region is not surprising.<sup>14</sup> Through a *mélange* of liberalism and conservatism as well as of religious and scientific references, the text simultaneously attacks feminism, socialism as well as entire groups, in particular LGBTQ people. Because of its clear-cut conservative intersectionality, from our point of view it epitomizes RWI. Note that, already from its title, the book equates gender ideology to cultural subversion. Thus, a notion widely employed by the murderous Latin American dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s to name and degrade leftists (subversion) is now ‘updated’ in the fight against feminists. The book in this way gathers different issues and times in a unified right-wing narrative.

This book is not alone in its take on gender ideology, which has become topical within the Latin American right. The Vatican was of course a pioneer in distorting the expression ‘gender ideology’ to use it against the feminist movement and theory.<sup>15</sup> The (re-signified) term became popularized

in the context of the conservative discontents around the rise of the so-called agenda of new rights (i.e. abortion, same sex marriage and adoption, and transgender rights).<sup>16</sup> According to the proponents of the concept, feminism brings ideology where it should not be – the private space and the family. The notion of gender ideology also serves the purpose of discrediting feminist scholarship. The naturalness of the sexual difference, of the traditional family and even of heterosexuality are defended against the bulk of academic research that proves gender identity to heavily rely on cultural dynamics (Corredor, 2019). Such reaction sometimes meshes with a generic attack on the humanities and the social sciences, both of which are frequently said to fail the positivist test of scientific objectivity and are thus rendered useless and (precisely) ‘ideological’.

This rhetoric directly links gender ideology to ‘cultural Marxism’ and claims that both are pervasive in universities and public education in general.<sup>17</sup> One of the main and seemingly universal conservative anxieties is that radical views are supposedly being imposed on students of all ages, so teachers and teaching are thought of as central in the ideological battle. The figure of Antonio Gramsci and his concept of hegemony are frequently referenced to show how the left has consciously penetrated academia and popular culture.

Key, from our perspective on RWI, is that far-right activists from across Latin America consistently claim that gender ideology (feminism) and class struggle (Marxism) are intertwined evils (or even the same evil) that distort(s) reality and endanger(s) society (see empirical analysis below). The conceptual conflation between feminism and Marxism makes the latter immanently queer while any form of feminism becomes socialist. In short, the agenda of cultural reform is said to have been coopted by ‘sexualized communism’ (Márquez & Laje, 2017, p. 169) where class struggle mingles with a ‘liberticidal pansexualism’ (2017, p. 185). Feminism and Marxism become dangerous even regarding issues or areas they do not tackle or which they traditionally had quarrels about.

RWI portrays feminism as the new totalitarianism (Corredor, 2019). In fact, its activists argue that we are on the verge of a gender dictatorship that resembles the Marxist dictatorship of the proletariat (see, for example, pages 109 and 152 of *The Black Book of the New Left*). The use of the term dictatorship is significant, especially in Latin America where there is a recent history of democracy breakdowns, state terrorism and massive human rights violations. Interestingly, the main representatives of RWI often deny these violations. Feminism is also associated with extremism and Nazism and in fact feminists are frequently called feminazis. Obviously in this context feminism is perceived as more violent than *machismo*.

While good, decent women reject gender ideology, feminists do *everything* wrong. By protesting sexist events, they violate the liberal right to freedom of speech. By promoting abortion rights, they violate the sacred right to live. By asking for gender sensitive public policy, they become a heavy burden for taxpayers. They are portrayed as very cunning and dangerous, yet at the same time they are also stupid and the perfect target of mockery. The narrative inconsistencies are not necessarily a sign of weakness as RWI gathers all critics and criticisms of feminism and affect the terms of the conversation. In this way extreme (and on occasion frankly bizarre) views become more and more popular in Latin America.

Through attack and rejection RWI implicitly recognizes the disruptive egalitarian nature of feminism. The right is worried about feminism because it questions one of the main power structures that regulates our collective lives: patriarchy. But there is much more to this than what is seen at first sight. Besides the depth and complexity of patriarchy itself (Segato, 2018), the robust scholarship on intersectionality and other forms of critical theory have shown that domination is an integrated process. This means that power is not divided into the disciplines in which academics are trained. And, given that political economy, culture,

and subjectivity are not separated, once we start denaturalizing hierarchy, we cannot predict where such process will end. Questioning hierarchy at one level might slip into other levels or realms. The implication of this is that *any* form of activism that questions oppression is potentially radical in the very sense of Marx – i.e. going to the root of the issues. In their own – proto-fascistic – way, RWI activists and politicians understand this very well. It therefore makes sense that if questioning subordinations is a democratic gesture, RWI attempts to remove gender, class, and race from democratic contestation.

Given its heavy investments in inequality, RWI has a complicated relationship with democracy itself. Indeed, when the far-right ‘defends’ democracy, its enemies become redundant. In the following sections we explore how RWI works on Twitter.

## Tweeting RWI

3.96 billion people use social media today (We are social and Hootsuite, 2020b). That is more than half of the world’s population. Over the last decade, researchers have noticed that these networks have become pivotal spaces for political deliberation (Tumasjan et al., 2010; 2011). Twitter<sup>18</sup> is particularly relevant in this landscape. Despite not being as popular as the other big platforms, it has been identified as the social media for politics. Twitter has lowered barriers for participation (Anduiza et al., 2009) and it is used to campaign, coordinate protests, as well as disseminate and discuss news (Ausserhofer & Maireder, 2013).

Twitter works particularly well for the far-right.<sup>19</sup> Analysing the US, Hawley (2018) explains that this platform amplifies fascistic voices through (1) their interactions with celebrities or influencers and their millions of followers, thus targeting lurkers<sup>20</sup>; (2) the use of one or more anonymous account(s) to ‘troll’<sup>21</sup> and magnify messages; and (3) the circulation of shocking claims while framing their violence as honest or fun. To this, we would like to add that Twitter’s brief and speedy format stimulates simplification and reduces the space for reflexive and detailed thought.<sup>22</sup> Clearly, if we think about politics *a la* Habermas, in terms of collective deliberation, Twitter’s use of language does not seem to lead to such an exercise of thoughtfulness.

In North and Latin America alike, Twitter has been instrumental for the far-right’s preaching to widen its audience by circumventing the conservative establishment. The latter gets frequently accused of being either too soft or even complicit with the left. Against moderating filters and widely shared values such as civil dialogue and respect for diversity, the new voices of the right declare war on political correctness. Obviously, this cultural battle does not require – and indeed rejects – long and brainy elaborations and nuanced argumentation. As we will show below, it is instead waged through brief messaging, intense emotion, and often grotesque themes and imagery. In this context, transgression and aggression are frequently praised as good in and of themselves, or even as cathartically cleansing. This style of communication has reached the mainstream as it is being legitimized and even practiced by well-established politicians such as Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro who consistently equate honesty to cruelty.

## Methodological strategy

We conducted a systematic content analysis of 30,858 tweets by 20 prominent Latin American influencers, activists, and politicians (see Table 1). Besides being active in Twitter these individuals are remarkable contributors to right-wing politics in different arenas such as social movements, journalism, and/or electoral politics. All the accounts and their tweets were public at the moment

of the study, and they were collected using the *rtweet* package of the R cran statistical software (Kearney, 2019). For each account, the maximum limit of tweets collected was 3200. Retweets were removed in order to identify and analyse original material. This explains variations in time range and number of tweets. Additionally, we considered tweets up to 26 February 2020 – when the first case of COVID-19 was reported in Latin America – to neutralize the massive effect that the pandemic has had over the public conversation within the region.

Two kinds of analysis were conducted: A correlation coefficient calculation for pairs of words and a sentiment analysis of each tweet. To calculate the correlations among words we used the phi coefficient. It corresponds to Pearson correlation applied to two binary variables, so its interpretation is similar. Phi coefficient reflects how more likely it is that two words would appear together, or not, rather than one of them appearing without the other:

$$\varphi = \frac{(n_{00}n_{11} - n_{01}n_{10})}{\sqrt{n_{1.}n_{0.}n_{.1}n_{.0}}}$$

	Y = 1	Y = 0	Total
X = 1	$n_{11}$	$n_{10}$	$n_{1.}$
X = 0	$n_{01}$	$n_{00}$	$n_{0.}$
total	$n_{.1}$	$n_{.0}$	$n$

For the sentiment analysis we used the ‘bag of words’ approach in which each tweet is considered as a combination of its individual words, so it is treated as a single document. The sentiment in the tweet is calculated as the sum of the sentiment of the words that compose it. The dictionary used for the analysis was the NRC Word-Emotion Association Lexicon. This lexicon assigns the following emotions to a set of words: anger, anticipation, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise, and trust. For our purposes only the larger distinction between positive and negative sentiments has been considered.

To jointly visualize correlation and sentiment we have used graphs. In these graphs, each node represents a word and the width of the link between them reflects the phi coefficient. Each link is coloured indicating the mean sentiment score of the tweets in which the connected words occurred jointly. Only pairs of words that registered a correlation greater than 0.15 and that individually exceeded an absolute frequency threshold (defined according to the number of tweets of each account) were graphed. Green and red indicate positive and negative emotions respectively, while grey denotes neutrality. Note that the colours only appear in the digital version of the article and that the words in the graphs are in the original form in which they were written.

We noticed that the dictionary assigns sentiments to keywords of the narratives under analysis and this could add bias. As an example, *abortion* has a negative connotation and *president* or *family* a positive one. To fix this issue, we calculated an adjusted sentiment score removing the terms that appeared in the graphs. No significant differences in the results were identified so we show the graphs using the standard lexicon. Throughout the research we did a comprehensive and detailed qualitative content analysis of the tweets. We also studied other interventions and features of the 20 subjects such as interviews, YouTube posts, press articles, and institutional affiliations.

In the following section, we show the results for the whole sample (in Spanish)<sup>23</sup> and for three activists from Argentina (Nicolás Márquez), Brazil (Sara Winter) and Perú (Christian Rosas). In all cases these are leading figures of far-right activism in their countries. The rationale of focusing on

**Table 1.** Names, Twitter accounts, countries, personal and account profiles of the influencers, activists and politicians analysed.

Name	Twitter account	Country	Short profile description	Number of tweets	Time frame	Followers, up to August 2020
Jair Bolsonaro	@jairbolsonaro	Brazil	Retired military officer. 38th president of Brazil since January 1, 2019.	2449	2019-01-25 to 2020-02-26	6,672,511
Olavo de Carvalho	@oproriolavo	Brazil	Self-promoted philosopher, political pundit, astrologer, and journalist.	3044	2019-03-04 to 2020-02-26	456,053
Agustín Laje	@AgustinLaje	Argentina	Political Scientist, social media influencer and author. Founding Director of Fundación Centro de Estudios LIBRE. Author of <i>El libro negro de la Nueva Izquierda</i> .	970	2019-03-24 to 2020-02-26	337,247
Sara Winter	@_SaraWinter	Brazil	'Pro-life' activist and social media influencer involved in far-right politics and in the Bolsonaro government. Leader of the radical far-right group 'Brazil's 300'.	2867	2016-10-21 to 2020-02-26	268,378
Emmanuel Danann	@DanannRock	Argentina	Right-wing influencer, media personality.	444	2013-01-11 to 2020-02-26	104,476
Fernanda Betancourt	@FerBetancourt9	Mexico	Founder and activist of the Daughters of the MX.	1631	2019-12-02 to 2020-02-26	100,384
Vanesa Vallejo	@vanesavallejo3	United States–Colombia	Economist and journalist. Editor in Chief and columnist of PanAm Post: <a href="https://es.panampost.com">https://es.panampost.com</a>	698	2019-08-02 to 2020-02-26	98,277
Nicolás Márquez	@NickyMarquez1	Argentina	Lawyer, journalist, and author of <i>El libro negro de la Nueva Izquierda</i> .	2568	2017-12-26 to 2020-02-26	72,025
Carlos Leal	@CarlosLealMx	Mexico	MP of the Partido Encuentro Social of the state of Nuevo León. Promoter of the 'parental pin'.	2458	2018-04-17 to 2020-02-26	70,561
Christian Camacho	@ccamacho88	Mexico	Right-wing political advisor and influencer.	1859	2018-11-01 to 2020-02-26	26,595
Juan Polanco	@JuanPolancoB	Dominican Republic	Coordinator of Pro-life Youth Dominican Republic. Founding Coordinator of the Centre for Research of Liberty and Family.	1079	2019-04-20 to 2020-02-26	18,298
Amparo Medina	@Amparo_Medina	Ecuador	President of Pro-life Ecuador, social media influencer, and activist against sexual and reproductive rights.	367	2020-01-03 to 2020-02-26	18,240
Fabrizio Alvarado	@FabriAlvarado7	Costa Rica	Journalist. Former MP and presidential candidate. General Secretary of the New Republic Party.	893	2013-07-13 to 2020-02-26	9718
Belén Lombardi	@BeluLombardi_	Argentina	Catholic social media influencer and pro-life activist.	2539	2019-01-19 to 2020-02-26	8580*

(Continued)

**Table 1.** Continued.

Name	Twitter account	Country	Short profile description	Number of tweets	Time frame	Followers, up to August 2020
Jorge Márquez	@jorgemarquezuy	Uruguay	Founder of the evangelical Church Life Mission for the Nations.	1783	2017-09-17 to 2020-02-26	6355
Bryan Albariño	@BryanAlbarino	Paraguay	Right-wing activist.	1470	2018-04-07 to 2020-02-26	5240
Álvaro Dastugue	@AlvaroDastugue	Uruguay	MP of the National Party and pastor of the evangelical Church Life Mission for the Nations.	1505	2015-04-28 to 2020-02-26	5214
Pamela Pizarro	@pizarro_pamela	Chile	Pro-life activist. Executive Director of Care Chile Foundation.	758	2012-05-18 to 2020-02-26	5129
Christian Rosas	@xtian_rosas	Peru	Leader of Don't Mess with my Children.	1280	2011-01-23 to 2020-02-26	3987
Aarón Lara	@LicAaronLara	Mexico	President of the Iberoamerican Congress for Life and Family.	196	2017-08-09 to 2020-02-26	1127


\*Around 40,000 when the account was censored in May 2020. <https://aconteciendo.com/2020/05/02/censura-twitter-cerro-la-cuenta-de-la-lider-juvenil-y-pro-vida-belu-lombardi/>  
Source: Own elaboration (2020).

specific individuals to further the analysis is that this procedure allows us to engage with the narrative under study in more detail and, so to speak, at a microlevel.

## Graphing RWI

To get an overview of the whole sample, we produced a graph in which all individuals/Twitter accounts in Spanish are included and have the same relative weight (Figure 1). To achieve this, we replicated a procedure 1000 times in which 500 tweets were randomly sampled for each account. In each replicate sentiment analysis (sentiment score and adjusted sentiment score) correlations were calculated. Finally, the overview was achieved considering the average of all the replicates. Since the statistics were computed from a conglomerate of different accounts, making it less likely to obtain high values of association, the correlation threshold considered was of 0.05.

In Figure 1 life is linked to family, god, right, and freedom. These connections are framed in positive emotions. The graph thus displays the core of the conservative narrative: the traditional family conceived as the basis of society and where children are safe and grow up healthy – and normal. Complementarily, the right to life is understood as the opposition to abortion (the word appears connected to women, right, and favour<sup>24</sup> framed in negative emotions). The consistent intertwining of these views with Christian beliefs, and sometimes explicit references to God, reveals the intimate relationship between RWI and Christian conservatism. The opposition to feminism is the main motif in all the 20 far-right figures under study, but as the following tweet by Belén Lombardi exemplifies, this battle is intersectional in the way we defined this term above:



**Figure 1.** Correlation graph of whole sample (Spanish only)\*. Source: Own elaboration (2020).

\*Includes words that jointly verify a correlation greater than 0.05 (links) and reach a minimum absolute frequency of 100 among all Spanish users' samples of tweets. Correlation degree is indicated by the width of the links and average sentiment score is indicated by their colour.

I am pro-life, Catholic, anti-feminist and pro-family. I am in favor of the military and the security forces, and against prostitution and gender ideology. If you don't like it, you can block me, but I'm not going to shut up because you don't like the way I think. Expressing myself is my right. (09/20/2019, 13:37)

The statement has distinct intersectional elements as the promotion of Christian values becomes a battle against feminism, which is also a campaign for law and order. As in countless other occasions, there is an appropriation of the liberal right of free speech used – rather paradoxically – to disqualify any critique or disagreement. Furthermore, the tweet aggressively challenges enemies of free self-expression while legitimizing authoritarian practices. Any keen observer knows what being generically 'in favor' of the military actually means in a Latin American country. As we already pointed out, under the eye of RWI the world is divided between violent feminists who try to censor ('them') and those decent people who have ordered lives and support the military ('us').

Feminism is the main obsession of RWI. As noted above, the terms abortion and women represent a negative nexus in Figure 1 and, unsurprisingly, the latter is linked to feminists. The correlation between gender and ideology is the strongest, and the latter is also linked to feminists and to (the) left. This is expected given the already analysed centrality of the notion of gender ideology in RWI and in the narrative of the radical right in general. We will see that when the level of

analysis is more specific, the intersectional – and vitriolic – character of the narrative becomes more robust but, even at this aggregated level, the graph provides a clear mental map of RWI.

The narrative also targets transgender people. The fixity of sex and identity is asserted once and again – that the only valid marriage is between a (‘real’) man and a (‘real’) woman goes without saying. The right seems to understand very well that these issues are relevant and that they affect society as a whole. This is revealed in a tweet by the president of the evangelical Iberoamerican Congress for Life and Family about transgender rights in Uruguay: ‘We will not allow laws<sup>25</sup> that threaten life and family. #RepealtheTransgenderLaw. We will defend Latin America’ (07/22/2019, 16:37). This also exemplifies a highly transnationalized agenda.<sup>26</sup>


We already referred to the centrality of Agustín Laje, one of the authors of *The Black Book of the New Left*, within Latin American RWI. This prominence is revealed by the fact that he is so profusely named by his fellow activists that @agustinlaje appears in the graph.<sup>27</sup> This explains the neutral tone of the set of connections between the words, as the tweets that talk about Laje’s books and conferences have a more positive tone. And here is Laje in his own words: ‘I defend life of the fetus and his mother, I abhor gender ideology, I vindicate our glorious armed forces, I support the repression of criminals and I sympathize with Bolsonaro and Trump’ (10/31/2019, 11:03). The similarity of many of these tweets is striking which shows that RWI operates through stubborn iteration. These narratives are also present in powerful movements such as the *Brazilian Schools without Party* or the transnational *Don’t Mess with my Children* which have affected both public debate and policy.

There are views, assertions, and concepts, however, that are prominent even though they get diffused in the thousands of tweets under analysis. We realized this by diving into the material: we studied the discourse of each individual in depth, focusing on the main concepts illustrated by the graphs and analysing the content of each tweet. This brought about findings that demand attention. In what follows, we focus on three examples: the Argentinian intellectual Nicolás Márquez, co-author of *The Black Book of the New Left*; Sara Winter, a Brazilian activist and the female influencer with more followers than all of the women in the sample; and, finally, from Perú, Christian Rosas, a leading voice of *Don’t Mess with my Children*.

### *Nicolás Márquez (@NickyMarquez1, Argentina)*

As pointed out before *The Black Book of the New Left*, which Márquez coauthored with Laje, works as a manifesto for RWI. And even though Laje is the most famous and influential of the two, Márquez is a relevant voice within the Argentinian far-right and joined the NOS party in 2020, in the context of the debate about the legalization of abortion. Furthermore, Márquez seems to be the perfect example of RWI. His aggressive rhetoric gathers gender ideology and the left, connecting them to death, murder, and terrorism. He viciously targets Victoria Donda (@vikidonda), a progressive congresswoman whose parents were disappeared by the State in the 1970s. In several rather cruel tweets, Márquez explicitly relates the ‘terrorist’ past of Donda’s parents as leftist militants to her pro-choice advocacy. The feminists are the *Montoneras* (guerrilla forces) of today who want to legalize genocide (as he calls abortion on some occasions). Thus, it is not surprising that in [Figure 2](#) the word abortion is linked to homicide, crime, and child, which is also connected to kill.

Márquez claims that feminism is authoritarian. The graph shows this through the connection between the words gender and dictatorship. At the same time, he endorses the real – and brutal – right-wing authoritarian regime that ruled Argentina between 1973 and 1983 and ‘disappeared’ thousands of citizens, a fact that he denies (the hashtag ‘they weren’t 30.000’ – #nofueron30mil – in reference to the number of people killed by the dictatorship is used as part of his rhetoric). Because of his open support for State terrorism – as shown in the graph, he calls it ‘war’ – he has been



**Figure 2.** Correlation graph of tweets by Nicolás Márquez\*. Source: Own elaboration (2020).

\*Includes words that jointly verify a correlation greater than 0.15 (links) and reach a minimum absolute frequency of 30 among Nicolás Márquez's tweets. Correlation degree is indicated by the width of the links and average sentiment score is indicated by their colour.

labelled as fascist or even a Nazi. His reply has been that he is not a Nazi (that he even criticizes Nazism in his books) and that, in fact, feminists are the new Nazis. This is not just an angry metaphor: he considers that the left today is at least as dangerous as Hitler. This might sound confounding for many readers, yet the expression *feminazi* has recently become popular.

Márquez's comments on international politics places him farther right than the Argentinian conservative establishment:

Jair Bolsonaro promised a free market and to eradicate gender ideology: the opposite of the 'de-government' of @mauriciomacri [former right-wing President of Argentina], marked by statism and gender ideology as cultural priority. Brazil in two weeks has overcome us (with all merit) in the world context. (01/01/2019, 23:11)

Jair Bolsonaro and Donald Trump are mentioned in many of the tweets under analysis as two of the few presidents that deserve respect. It therefore makes sense that the link between @mauriciomacri and government is coloured in red in Figure 2. It also makes sense that Javier Milei (@jmilei) is mentioned explicitly by Márquez. A rising figure in the far-right's culture and a legislative representative in Argentina since 2021, Milei is also an example of a successful passage from the RWI's influencers' sphere to the electoral arena.

A typical anxiety of the extreme right is the influence that the left exercises through public education and the cultural industries. A hashtag used by Márquez to talk about this is 'Educational

Indoctrination’ (#AdoctrinamientoEducativo). As we see in the following two tweets this notion is intersectional as it includes diverse themes such as the discussion of the recent political past – which is of course a way of engaging the present – and the controversy around ‘gender ideology’:

If you were told that the disappeared did not put bombs but fought for the student bus pass, you have been a victim of Educational Indoctrination. (05/25/2018, 0:11)

The Educational Indoctrination is coming to an end. The healthy and conservative youth stands up against progressivism, abortion and the gender superstition. (05/25/2018, 0:19)


Again, gender and ideology are the two words that, along with *nicolás* and *márquez*, show the strongest correlation. They are key in *Márquez’s* narrative where time itself is filled with political meaning: gender ideology has ‘updated’ the project of the left which is a chameleonic force with different manifestations and moments. We have mentioned that intersectional scholarship moves on the spectrum of separability/inseparability of the intersected dimensions. We also already pointed out that RWI resembles this conceptual structure, as it sometimes separates its enemies and in other occasions meshes them into one single ‘thing’. In one tweet, *Márquez* denounces the sodomy lobby and *lesbo-Marxist elements* for protesting a talk he gave with *Laje* at the Buenos Aires Book Fair of 2018 (self-reference is constant in his tweets). He also added a hashtag ‘media silence’ (#SilencioMediatico) to denounce the establishment’s complicity with gender ideology. Who would guess that lesbian and Marxist would become one and the same concept!

### *Sara Winter (@\_SaraWinter, Brazil)*

Sara Winter narrates her story and identity in the terms of a repented feminist who, through a process of enlightenment and personal growth, has become pro-life.<sup>28</sup> She worked for the Bolsonaro government and has supported paramilitary activity in Brazil. Winter’s tweeting activity – and highly publicized political actions – fully illustrate RWI as they simultaneously attack the left and feminism while supporting not only Bolsonaro but also Trump (see [Figure 3](#)). The internationalized scope of her views is also expressed in negative terms: resembling the gesture of *Márquez* but from the other side of the border, Winter scorns Argentina for advancing in the direction of legalizing abortion (hence, the link between the words *argentina* and *abortion* in the graph). Her discourse obviously targets feminism and the feminist movement too.

We already noticed that the theme of gender ideology has prominence within RWI. The extreme tones of Winter’s views in this regard are sharp. For example, she claims that ‘effeminate’ men search for ideologies such as feminism to justify their lack of masculinity and ‘that is evident when we look at leftist militancy’ (2/9/2018 18:09). She also condemns Judith Butler, the prominent US queer theory scholar, as the creator of a conceptual perversion. In her narrative, childhood is perceived as a victim of feminism which is connected through gender ideology to pedophilia. Gender ideology takes away the innocence or even the life of kids: it permits killing babies and raping children as well as changing their sex.

The prominence of the theme of the left is clear in Winter’s discourse. In a narrative move that resembles the American Alt-right and the neofascists in Europe, she gathers the mainstream media, the left, and corruption. In her own words *Globo*, the giant media firm, ‘promoting a campaign against fake news is like Hitler complaining about Nazism, Marx complaining about communism or Lula complaining about corruption #vaisarinha’ (28/7/2018 00:27). As *Márquez* does, Winter claims to be a victim of mainstream media’s hostility.



**Figure 3.** Correlation graph of tweets by Sara Winter\*. Source: Own elaboration (2020).

\*Includes words that jointly verify a correlation greater than 0.15 (links) and reach a minimum absolute frequency of 38 among Sara Winter's tweets. Correlation degree is indicated by the width of the links and average sentiment score is indicated by their colour.

The left is the enemy of the people and of moral, religious, and scientific truth. It even corrupts the good intentions around 'inclusion'. Such is the theme of the following tweet which expresses RWI so clearly that it does not need further interpretation:

The left likes inclusion

Inclusion of Gender Ideology in the heads of children

Inclusion of Marxism in the heads of university students

Inclusion of abortion in healthcare policies

And inclusion of public money in their bank accounts. (07/24/2019, 14:33)

### **Christian Rosas (@xtian\_rosas, Perú)**


Considering only his followers on Twitter, Rosas can hardly be considered a powerful influencer. However, this man who defines himself with the words Christian, conservative and political scientist is the spokesperson for *Don't Mess with my Children* in Perú, a conservative advocacy group with regional reach, and he is also very active both in social and traditional media.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, he is a political operator of the right who has expressed support for both Alberto Fujimori as well as his daughter Keiko Fujimori. Given his role within the regional conservative movement, Rosas'

posts on Twitter are relevant for our analysis. Once again, the conceptual contours of RWI are clearly delineated in the narratives advanced by this activist.

In Figure 4 the words woman and man are linked in green, and are connected to life, family, and marriage. The links with orientation are presented in a neutral tone, but this cannot be mistaken for a positive interpretation of homosexuality. In fact, in many tweets Rosas defends *sexual re-orientation* as a legitimate therapeutic treatment to ‘cure’ homosexuality.<sup>30</sup> He also claims that LGBTQ people have ‘fake identities’ (9/21/2018, 23:35).

As we have seen before, RWI is displayed with local flavours. In this case the attack on feminism is combined with praise for controversial former President Alberto Fujimori and his military victory against (leftist) ‘terrorism’; Rosas highlights that Fujimori achieved this with few human rights violations (8/8/2012, 12:25; see Figure 4).<sup>31</sup> This is why, in Figure 4, the word fujimori is linked to thanks and to human rights. Furthermore, he conceptually links ‘communist terrorism’ and abortion rights: ‘Activists who defended terrorists now promote the legalization of natal terrorism, abortion, as a fundamental right for women’ (14/3/2012 14:48). For him, the ‘defense of life of the unborn’ is a matter of human rights, not of religious but of moral order (22/12/2011, 13:32). Again, anti-feminism and anti-communism intersect within a multidimensional political agenda (i.e. RWI).

Rosas’ tweets are sometimes messy, but they are clear in their implications. He consistently appeals to Christianity and Jesus, considers that marriage can only be heterosexual, attacks feminist NGOs (such as the Centre for the Promotion and Defence of Sexual and Reproductive Rights, Promsex), and justifies right-wing authoritarian rule.



**Figure 4.** Correlation graph of tweets by Christian Rosas\*. Source: Own elaboration (2020).

\*Includes words that jointly verify a correlation greater than 0.15 (links) and reach a minimum absolute frequency of 20 among Christian Rosas’ tweets. Correlation degree is indicated by the width of the links and average sentiment score is indicated by their colour.

## Conclusion

Twitter allows the far-right to circumvent the political establishment's communicative filters and etiquette, to widen audiences, and to spread extreme views. In Latin America, the platform has been instrumental for the consolidation of a conservative perspective that attacks feminism and the left simultaneously while weaving economic, cultural, and social themes into a single narrative. We have tried to capture the multidimensionality of this discourse through the conceptual category of right-wing intersectionality. RWI appropriates the rhetoric of rights to forward a right-wing agenda with authoritarian edges, framed by 'traditional' Christian values. Sometimes these moves are synthesized in the umbrella category of gender ideology. RWI might not be an exclusively Latin American phenomenon and yet the narratives that we have analysed have a clear regional flavour.

RWI shows that it is time to accept that culture and discourse are not a distraction from class-based conflict. RWI is *a multilayered, integrated, and holistic reactionary project*. This innovation in the terrain of right-wing politics mirrors the main insight of scholarship on intersectionality: that power is not divided into the silos of political economy, culture, gender and so on. Despite its crude simplifications, RWI incarnates an effective understanding of how power and hegemony work. Of course, RWI also reverses intersectionality in normative and ideological terms as it weaponizes 'intersections' to defend hierarchy and undermine progressive causes.

While progressive parties in office became ideologically frigid and technocratic, made enormous concessions to neoliberalism, and abandoned the radical political horizons attached to the left, RWI reclaims ideology and emotions, challenges the liberal political establishment, and claims for itself the transformative power and radicalness of politics, reenchanting political life but in a dangerous direction. These features are key to understanding its capacity to inspire. Furthermore, RWI reactivates antidemocratic tendencies within liberalism and dominant common-sense. Thus, it is not surprising that self-identified centrist citizens sometimes seem more concerned about protecting the freedom of expression of fascistic movements and individuals than about the (sometimes physical) violence that they inflict on their opponents and on democracy itself.

In contrast with the heavy jargon of intersectionality (Robertson, 2017) RWI is didactic, clear, simple. The power of simplification is a huge asset in a cultural environment that rejects complexity, philosophy, and nuance, and where technology, development and good management are the new mantras for mainstream left and right alike. How a discourse that emphasizes complexity can compete with one that oversimplifies is a question that remains open. Can progressives communicate the democratic value of complexity in ways that do not backfire on their causes?

RWI's violent and antidemocratic politics demand attention from activists and scholars alike. By contrast it highlights the need to reimagine emancipatory politics beyond the straitjacket of 'rights', nation States, and liberal institutions. At least we can be sure of this: RWI requires engagement beyond indignation.

## Notes

1. We employ the notion of political narrative in the plain sense of a political perspective being articulated through language. We are aware of the complexity of the notion of narrative and of the recent explosion of narrative approaches within the social sciences (Ravecca & Dauphinee, 2018).
2. See also Combahee River Collective (2015), Coll Planas and Cruells (2013), Gunnarsson (2017), Henning (2015), Lugones (2008), McCall (2005), Nash (2017), Platero (2012), and Viveros Vigoya (2015).
3. As we will see the dual condition of being academic and activist is used by right-wing actors to criticize feminism and other critical approaches. An anonymous reviewer raised this relevant issue.

4. The blend is not entirely new and in fact RWI updates old attempts of depicting the women's movements as a trojan horse for communism (Valobra, 2014).
5. This includes policy and legislative changes (Pérez Bentancur & Rocha-Carpiuc, 2020).
6. We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this relevant point.
7. *Don't Mess with my Children* has branches in different countries, see for example: <https://conmishijosnotemetas.pe/>; <https://conmishijosnotemetas.com.ar/#/-inicio/>
8. *Schools without Party*: <https://www.escolasempartido.org/>
9. The role of the latter in the politics of the region seems to be increasing (Segado-Boj et al., 2015; Aruquete & Calvo, 2018).
10. We thank Mara Karina Silva for this clear and concise articulation of RWI. We also want to acknowledge Yesola Kweon for showing to us other potential definitions and approaches to the phenomenon.
11. On the relevance of emotions on contemporary political life, see Gioscia and Wences (2017).
12. Occasionally RWI narrates a patriarchal tale about women being fooled and used by the evil forces of communism, so vaguely defined that it includes international organizations and NGOs. After all, the story *has to be* about a struggle between men, even when women overflow the streets, build movements, and develop powerful theoretical interventions that advance critical theory.
13. Vaggione and Campos Machado (2020) propose the category of neoconservatism as an adept framework to understand the current landscape of conservative politics; we do not dispute the usefulness of the category, but we are interested in highlighting the intersectional character of such a landscape. See all contributions to *Politics & Gender's* online symposium about the conservative backlash in Latin America (Biroli & Caminotti, 2020).
14. The book re-arranges or fabricates historical facts to match its script. It is populated by inaccurate interpretations of feminist and critical theory authors (amusingly, it quotes 'Foucault for beginners'). It is poorly written, authors' names are misspelled throughout the text, and citations and references are wrongly presented. The research is weak, and its sources are not reliable. The lack of well-crafted arguments is compensated by repeating the same ideas once and again in rhetorically formulaic ways.
15. The concept was originally coined to critically explore gendered dynamics, encompassing intersectional approaches (see Collins, 1990).
16. For a detailed analysis of the notion of gender ideology see Cornejo-Valle and Pichardo (2017) and Corredor (2019). In 1998 the Episcopal Conference of Peru published one of the first texts in Latin America that advocates for this 'anti-gender' perspective.
17. In this regard RWI incorporates and resembles the narratives of the American Alt-Right (Hawley, 2017; Woods, 2019).
18. Twitter is a platform for microblogging messages of up to 280 characters (called tweets) that allows the user to instantly share ideas, photos, or videos. It was launched on 13 July 2006 and, since then, has grown constantly: currently, it has 166 million daily users (The Washington Post, 2020). According to the latest We Are Social and Hootsuite Report (2020a), three Latin American countries are among the 20 with more Twitter penetration worldwide (Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina). The same report states that Twitter's audience self-identifies predominantly as male (62%).
19. This resembles the experience of the American Alt-right (Hawley, 2018; Froio & Ganesh, 2018),
20. A lurker is someone who participates in a virtual community only in a receptive way.
21. A troll is someone who tries to provoke other users in a virtual community.
22. This linguistic compression brings to mind the concerns that philosopher Herbert Marcuse expressed decades ago about the generalized imposition of 'a syntax in which the structure of the sentence is abridged and condensed in such way that no tension, no 'space' is left between the parts of the sentences' (Marcuse, 1991, p. 86).
23. For the aggregated analysis, it was only possible to work with the accounts in the same language. We chose to show the Spanish graph because Spanish speakers were the majority of the sample.
24. This is because the expression 'being in favor of abortion' and 'being in favor of life' or 'family' are profusely used in the tweets under study.
25. Law 19.684 recognizes and protects transgender's people rights.
26. This video in Spanish is very revealing in such regard: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6gng8Z-DHg4>
27. Laje's influence is strong in Twitter and beyond. He was one of the main speakers of the second South American Congress for Life and Family.

28. This narrative strategy anchored in regret for a shameful past seems common among anti-feminist female leaders which is an interesting topic for future research.
29. For a description of Rosas' relevance, see Iglesias (2018), Cariboni (2018) and Rousseau (2020). For an analysis on *Don't Mess with my Children* and its role in the national campaign against the Ministry of Education's new National Curricula for Basic Education in Peru, see Meneses (2019) and Rousseau (2020).
30. This is one of the links that can be mistaken because of the lexicon's bias: the adjusted version of the graph reveals negative emotions.
31. In fact, Fujimorism baked the mobilization against the inclusion of 'gender' in basic education (Meneses, 2019).

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## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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